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15-03941/1  
27 JUL 1955

Mr. John D. Jernegan  
Deputy Assistant Secretary  
for Near Eastern, South Asian  
and African Affairs  
Department of State  
Washington, D. C.

Dear Mr. Jernegan:

In accordance with my note of acknowledgement of July 1, here are my comments on the Working Group study on the "U.S. Position Regarding Middle East Defense." I have numbered these for convenience.

1. I concur in the military and political objectives stated in the paper, and agree in general with its conclusions. As you know, the intelligence community completed on 21 June a National Intelligence Estimate, NIE 30-55, Middle East Defense Problems and Prospects, and the Working Group paper appears consistent with that estimate on its principal points. In particular, we would support, from an intelligence standpoint, your major conclusion that it will be politically necessary for the U.S. to adhere, within a year at most, to a Middle East defense organization. (Page v. of the Working Group study; see Conclusion 6 and Section VI of the NIE.)

2. However, we are somewhat less optimistic than the Working Group as to the possibilities for progress with specific countries. In particular, I doubt whether the Shah would bring Iran into such a pact unless we gave him more military aid than is envisaged in the paper. In the NIE, we thought only that Iran's adherence "in time" was "at least an even chance."

3. While U.S. aid on the suggested scale may induce Egypt to cooperate in some fashion, I doubt if she would go so far as to join anything based on the Turkish-Iraqi pact for a long time to come. In the NIE, we concluded that Egypt would oppose the Pact "at least for the next few months and possibly for considerably longer," and that this opposition would deter Jordan and Lebanon, at least, from joining. Our operational people feel keenly that the proposed actions

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may produce a reaction by the Egyptian Government, and an effect on the Egyptian political situation, more violent than the paper appears to anticipate.

4. Syria is, of course, a major question mark in any calculation, with a political situation so fluid that at any given moment we may be faced with a government that would be not only unwilling to join such a pact, but a serious anti-U.S. influence.

5. We are less hopeful than the paper on the question of Arab-Israeli relations. While improvement over the next six months is surely "possible," as the paper states, the problems will remain extremely difficult. I think we will have a better line on this after the Israeli elections, and as you know we are planning to complete the pending NIE on this question promptly thereafter. In any event, we must expect the Israelis to react adversely to U.S. joining of the Pact. Though this reaction may be mitigated by a U.S.-Israeli treaty, the kind of treaty and aid envisaged would be unlikely to offset it to the extent of satisfying Israel (if that is ever possible).

6. On the question of stationing U.S. or Western forces, as stated in NIE 30-55 (paras. 51 and 55), this idea continues to be offensive to most states of the area. I would not pin too much on that attitude changing even over a period of five years, although the introduction of agreed facilities might in time soften resistance to the presence of forces.

7. As to Pakistan, we have pointed out in the NIE (para. 19) that her cooperation will be motivated primarily by desire to ensure U.S. aid. I doubt if she would commit forces, even of token size, to Middle East defense until relations with India are improved and until Pakistan is better satisfied with her ability to hold her own northern frontiers against attack through Afghanistan.

8. On the question of the relative value of various countries, we feel the paper may under-rate the eventual contribution of which Iran is capable. We agree, nonetheless, that the development of the Iranian potential will be a "slow and difficult" process.

9. Recent contacts between the Middle East and India, especially the Nehru-Massar talks, suggest that it will be desirable to give very close consideration to the effect on India of whatever is done.

Sincerely,

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**Stamp**

Allen W. Lalles  
Director

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Concur

Robert Amory, Jr.

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20 July 1955 /tmc

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